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ABSTRACT
In the ﬁrst collaboration between climate economists, climate ﬁnancial risk modellers and ﬁ-
nancial regulators, we apply the CLIMAFIN framework described in Battiston at al. (2019) to 
provide a forward-looking climate transition risk assessment of the sovereign bonds’ portfoli-
os of solo insurance companies in Europe. We consider a scenario of a disorderly introduction 
of climate policies that cannot be fully anticipated and priced in by investors. First, we anal-
yse the shock on the market share and proﬁtability of carbon-intensive and low-carbon activ-
ities under climate transition risk scenarios. Second, we deﬁne the climate risk management 
strategy under uncertainty for a risk averse investor that aims to minimise her largest losses. 
Third, we price the climate policies scenarios in the probability of default of the individual 
sovereign bonds and in the bonds’ climate spread. Finally, we estimate the largest gains/losses 
on the insurance companies’ portfolios conditioned to the climate scenarios. We ﬁnd that 
the potential impact of a disorderly transition to low-carbon economy on insurers portfolios 
of sovereign bonds is moderate in terms of its magnitude. However, it is non-negligible in 
several scenarios. Thus, it should be regularly monitored and assessed given the importance 
of sovereign bonds in insurers’ investment portfolios.
1. INTRODUCTION
The topic of sustainable ﬁnance has gained attention among European insurers and the 
ﬁnancial supervisory community alike. This is fuelled by recent initiatives promoted by 
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ﬁnancial supervisors, central banks and policy makers to align ﬁnance to sustainability. 
For instance, in 2018 several international central banks and ﬁnancial regulators launched 
the Central Banks and Financial Regulators’ Network for Greening the Financial System 
(NGSF 2018). In 2019, the European Commission (EC) launched the “Action Plan on 
Sustainable Finance” to tackle climate related risks and achieve the long-term goal of 
economic transformation towards a low-carbon economy. These initiatives are aimed to 
mitigate the potential ﬁnancial risks stemming from a disorderly low-carbon transition, 
by supporting the alignment of investments to the climate targets.
Limiting the global temperature increase to 2°C above pre-industrial levels (i.e. consis-
tently with Paris Agreement, UNFCCC 2016) requires the timely and coordinated intro-
duction of climate policies, e.g. a global carbon tax (Stiglitz et al., 2017; IMF, 2019) aimed 
to drastically decrease the CO2 emissions produced by the combustion of fossil fuels in 
the economy.
However, governments are delaying in the introduction of climate policies, leading po-
tentially to a disorderly transition, where the introduction of climate policies is sudden 
and cannot be fully anticipated and priced in by investors (Battiston et al., 2017). In this 
context, ﬁrms whose revenues depend directly or indirectly on use of fossil fuels ener-
gy and electricity could face signiﬁcant losses (the so-called “carbon stranded assets”, 
Leaton et al. 2012). These losses will aﬀect the value of the ﬁnancial contracts issued 
by such ﬁrms and cascade onto their investors (Battiston et al., 2017), with implications 
on price volatility if large and correlated asset classes are involved (Monasterolo et al., 
2017), and on ﬁrms and countries’ ﬁnancial stability (Battiston and Monasterolo, 2019). 
In this respect, not only climate related exposures of insurance ﬁrms towards the corpo-
rate sector but also towards the sovereigns in which those activities take place could be 
negatively aﬀected. Given the role of the insurance sector in the economy and ﬁnance, 
the exposure of insurance ﬁrms to climate-related ﬁnancial risks deserve to be monitored 
and assessed.
A main obstacle for insurers to embed climate in their portfolios’ risk management strat-
egies is represented by the lack of appropriate methodologies to price forward-looking 
climate risks and opportunities in the value of individual ﬁnancial contracts and in the 
probabilities of default of investors portfolios. The reason is that climate risks are for-
ward-looking (because they refer to future occurrences), characterised by deep uncer-
tainty (thus leading to fat tailed distributions, Weitzman, 2009), non-linearity (Ackerman, 
2017), and endogeneity that could give rise to multiple equilibria (Battiston et al., 2017). 
These characteristics makes the reliance on historical data much less relevant for risk 
assessment. This means that climate transition risks cannot be priced based on historical 
market data (e.g. to calculate volatility measures), but require to use the information on 
future climate policy shocks produced by climate economic models (e.g. Integrated As-
sessment Models - IAMs), and to introduce climate ambiguity.
Nevertheless, traditional ﬁnancial pricing models (e.g. Merton, 1974; Black and Scholes, 
1973; Black and Cox, 1976; Duﬃe and Singleton, 1999) are not able by construction to em-
bed the characteristics of climate risks. Indeed, their ﬁnancial risk assessment is based on 
past ﬁrms’ performance (e.g. the computation of volatility measures based on historical 
data). In addition, they are constrained by conditions of normal distributions, complete 
markets, and lack of arbitrage (Battiston and Monasterolo, 2019).
Thus, pricing climate in investors’ portfolio requires to move from the backward-look-
ing nature of traditional ﬁnancial risk assessment and of investors’ benchmarks to a for-
ward-looking assessment of risk. In this paper, we develop an application of the CLIMA-
EUROPEAN INSUR ANCE AND OCCUPATIONAL PENSIONS AUTHORIT Y
70
FIN framework (Battiston et al., 2019) to calculate the probability of default of sovereign 
bonds, portfolio’s ﬁnancial risk metrics (e.g. the Climate Spread), and the largest losses/
gains on insurers’ portfolios conditioned to future climate transition shocks. This analysis 
represents the ﬁrst climate-ﬁnancial risk assessment developed in collaboration between 
scientists of the climate economic community that informs the Intergovernmental Panel 
on Climate Change (IPCC), climate ﬁnancial risk experts and a ﬁnancial regulatory insti-
tution with a mandate to contribute to ﬁnancial stability.
We build on CLIMAFIN, because it is the ﬁrst approach to combine forward-looking cli-
mate transition risk shocks and associated economic trajectories based on We build on 
CLIMAFIN because it is the ﬁrst approach to combine forward-looking climate transition 
risk scenarios and associated economic trajectories based on climate economic models, 
with ﬁnancial pricing models and ﬁnancial risk metrics. In addition, CLIMAFIN provides 
a transparent and robust methodology for climate ﬁnancial risk assessment under deep 
uncertainty, by considering the characteristics of climate risks and of ﬁnancial risks. 
In this application, we build on the LIMITS45 database of climate policy scenarios (Kriegler 
et al., 2013). These models are the reference for scientiﬁc community and the IPCC, with 
climate ﬁnancial risk metrics and methods that are now a reference in both the academic 
and practitioners’ community, i.e. the Climate Spread, the Climate VaR, climate ﬁnancial 
pricing models and ﬁnancial network-based Climate Stress-tests (Battiston et al., 2017). 
In the context of potentially destabilizing ﬁnancial impact of a disorderly climate transi-
tion and of unmitigated climate change, transparent and robust methodologies can sup-
port ﬁnancial supervisors’ policy decisions to align ﬁnance to sustainability and climate 
targets while preventing ﬁnancial instability.
This article is organized as follows. Section 2 elaborates on the relevant literature. Sec-
tion 3 provides a description of the data sample used and the section 4 describes the 
CLIMAFIN methodology for pricing forward-looking climate transition risks in the value 
of sovereign bonds and in investors’ portfolios. The results of empirical analysis conduct-
ed on the portfolios of EU insurance companies are presented in section 5, while section 
6 concludes discussing the linkages with the next steps of this research into the Climate 
Stress-test.
2. LITERATURE REVIEW
Recent research suggest that climate risks (and opportunities) are not properly priced 
yet in the value of ﬁnancial contracts and thus, in investor portfolios’ risk management 
strategies. This means that investors might, on the one hand, increase (and trade) their 
exposure to climate risks, and on the other hand, they might delay the scaling-up of 
green investments.
The literature has mostly covered corporate debt contracts, only recently the attention 
has focused on sovereign bonds and equity holdings. Alessi et al. (2019), Zerbib (2019) 
and Karpf and Mandel (2018) assessed if a green bonds’ premium exists in the bond mar-
ket, but found very diﬀerent results, based on the type of bonds contract analysed and 
the “green” deﬁnition used. In the catastrophe bonds (CAT) market, Morana and Sbrana 
45 See the LIMITS database documentation for more details https://tntcat.iiasa.ac.at/LIMITSDB/static/down-
load/LIMITS_overview_SOM_Study_Protocol_Final.pdf
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(2019) found that despite climate-led disasters have steadily increased from year 2000, 
the “multiple” (i.e. the return per unity of risk) of the CAT bonds has decreased.
Monasterolo and de Angelis analysed the US, EU and global stock market’s reaction 
to the announcement of the Paris Agreement. They found that the overall systematic 
risk for the low-carbon indices decreases consistently, while stock markets’ reaction is 
mild for most of carbon-intensive indices. Ramelli et al. (2018) and Wagner et al. (2018) 
analysed the stock market’s reaction to the election of Trump as President of the United 
States, and the appointment of the climate skeptic Scott Pruitt as a head of the US En-
vironmental Protection Agency, and found opposite results, i.e. that investors rewarded 
companies in high-emissions industries/companies demonstrating more responsible cli-
mate strategies.
With regard to sovereign bonds, Crifo et al. (2017) ﬁnd that high country’s Environmental 
Social Governance (ESG) ratings are associated with low borrowing costs (spread) for 
short-maturity sovereign bonds in advanced economics. In the contest of low-income 
countries, Kling et al. (2018) focus on the most climate vulnerable low-income countries 
(V20) exposed to climate physical risk occurred in the past. They ﬁnd a slightly higher 
cost of debt for a few countries, but they also point out the caveats that apply, such as 
the peculiarity of sovereign bonds’ markets in low- income countries and the nature of 
risks (e.g. geopolitical) to consider in the sovereign valuation.
All these analyses, despite focusing on diﬀerent types of ﬁnancial contracts and climate 
risks analyse climate shocks that occurred in the past, and that could have represented 
a  structural break in the series of prices and performance. In contrast, Battiston and 
Monasterolo (2019) developed the ﬁrst approach to price forward-looking climate tran-
sition risks in the value of individual sovereign bonds, by including the characteristics of 
climate risks (i.e. uncertainty, non-linearity and endogeneity of risk) in ﬁnancial valuation. 
They applied the model to the sovereign bonds of the OECD countries included in the 
Austrian National Bank (OeNB)’s non-monetary policy portfolio. They found that the 
(mis)alignment of an economy could already be reﬂected in the sovereign bonds’ spread 
(i.e. the climate spread) and change the ﬁscal and ﬁnancial risk position of a country.
Since ﬁnancial investors take decisions based on what they can measure, and their deci-
sions do inﬂuence (and are inﬂuenced by) the benchmark in their respective markets, as-
sessing climate risks in ﬁnancial contracts is crucial from an investors’ risk management 
perspective, and for ﬁnancial supervisors whose mandate is about preserving ﬁnancial 
stability. To our knowledge, this article is the ﬁrst study assessing climate-related ﬁnan-
cial risks stemming from insurance companies’ exposures to sovereign bonds.
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3. DATA SAMPLE
We utilized Quarterly Solvency II Reporting Template on List of Assets (SII QRT)46 and 
Centralized Security Database (CSDB). Solo data of insurers from 31 countries in EU/EEA 
that reported Solvency II data at the end of 2018 are employed. Our dataset includes all 
insurers’ investments into sovereign bonds (CIC code equal 1). This data is complemented 
by information on the characteristics of the bonds available from the CSDB. The ﬁnal 
dataset contains 1576 insurance companies, 142 bond issuers and 10746 bonds. The total 
amount of the insurance government portfolio considered is 2.1 trillion EUR. The full de-
scription of the data set utilized in this study is provided in the table below.
46 S.06.02 template.
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Table A1.1: List of variables utilized
Variable name Description
Insurance identiﬁer Unique identiﬁer of solo insurance company (SII QRT)
Home country Country of authorization of the insurer (SII QRT)
ISIN code ISIN conde of the sovereign bond (SII QRT)
Issuer’s country Country that issued the bond (SII QRT)
Duration Residual duration of the bond (SII QRT)
Maturity Maturity date of the bond (SII QRT)
Term Diﬀerence in years between the date of bond’s maturity and 
the date of bond issuance (SII QRT)
Price Market value of the bond (SII QRT)
Nominal value Nominal value of the bond (SII QRT)
Coupon Coupon of the bond (CSDB)
Coupon type Type of the bond’s coupon (ﬁx, zero coupon) (CSDB)
Coupon frequency Coupon frequency of the bond (monthly, bi-monthly, 
quarterly, semi-annually, annually, zero coupon) (CSDB)
Note: All variables refer to 2018Q4.
4. METHODOLOGY
In this section, we introduce the concepts of climate physical and transition risks. 
Then, we deﬁne the climate policy shocks that we analyse in the context of a  disor-
derly low-carbon transition. Finally, we present the CLIMAFIN tool that we apply to 
price forward-looking climate transition risk in the value of individual sovereign bonds 
(introducing the climate sovereign spread) under deep uncertainty, and to assess the 
largest gains/losses on investors’ portfolios. CLIMAFIN includes climate scenarios ad-
justed ﬁnancial pricing models (for equity holdings, sovereign and corporate bonds, and 
loans) and climate scenarios conditioned risk metrics (such as the Climate Spread and 
the Climate VaR). These allow us to embed forward-looking climate risk scenarios in the 
valuation of counterparty risk, in the probability of default of securities and in the largest 
losses on investors’ portfolios (Battiston et al., 2019).
We opted for CLIMAFIN for two reasons. First, it is the ﬁrst approach that combines for-
ward-looking climate transition risk shocks and associated economic trajectories based 
on climate economic models (in this application, the LIMITS IAMs), which are the refer-
ence for the scientiﬁc community and the IPCC, with climate ﬁnancial risk metrics and 
methods that are now a reference in both the academic and practitioners’ community 
(Battiston et al., 2019). Second, CLIMAFIN provides a transparent and robust methodol-
ogy for climate ﬁnancial risk assessment under deep uncertainty. Importantly, this rep-
resents the ﬁrst climate-ﬁnancial risk assessment developed in collaboration between 
scientists of the climate economic community, climate ﬁnancial risk experts and a ﬁnan-
cial regulatory institution with a ﬁnancial stability mandate.
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4.1.  CLIMATE CHANGE AND FINANCIAL STABILITY: TRANSITION 
RISKS
Two main channels of risk transmissions from climate change to ﬁnance have been iden-
tiﬁed and analyzed so far, i.e. climate physical risks and climate transition risks. In our 
analysis we focus on climate transition risk because while climate physical risks are ex-
pected to be more visible in the mid to long-term period, triggering potentially irrevers-
ible socio-economic and environmental impacts (see IPCC 1.5°C 2018 Allen et al. 2018, 
Steﬀen et al. 2018), climate transition risks could happen sooner and be more ﬁnancially 
relevant (V. de Gaulhau (2018))47.
Climate transition risk refers to the economic and ﬁnancial risk arising from a  sudden 
revaluation of carbon-intensive and low-carbon assets and that cannot be fully antici-
pated by ﬁnancial actors. This risk can be driven by (i) Technological shocks (e.g. the fast 
decrease of renewable energy production costs and fast increase in their performance, 
or the change in minimum technology standards); (ii) Policy and regulatory shocks (e.g. 
the disordered introduction of a global carbon tax IMF, 2019) or a change in prudential 
regulation such as the introduction of Green Supporting Factors (HLEG, 2018); (iii) the 
sudden changes in the climate sentiments of ﬁnancial actors (Dunz et al., 2019), as a re-
sult of the expectations of market participants about the implementation of the climate 
policies.
Most important, climate risks diﬀer from the type of risks that investors are used to 
consider in ﬁnance. In particular, the nature of climate risks introduces several conceptu-
al and methodological challenges for traditional economic and ﬁnancial models, which 
then need to consider (Monasterolo, 2019):
 ? Non-linearity of impacts. The probability of forward-looking climate shocks can’t be 
inferred from historical data being non-linear and not normally distributed (Acker-
man, 2017);
 ? Forward-looking nature of risk. The impacts of climate change are on the time scale 
of two decades or longer1. However, the time horizon of ﬁnancial markets is much 
shorter. Investors’ decisions follow a much shorter time horizon (e.g. three months 
for fund managers) and are based on a  market benchmark (performance) that is 
backward-looking because estimated on past companies’ performance.
 ? Deep uncertainties that characterize climate impacts and their costs, due to the na-
ture of the earth system that leads to the presence of tail events (Weitzman 2009), 
tipping points and domino eﬀects (Steﬀen et al., 2018), which are associated to large 
uncertainty (Kriegler et al., 2009). Tipping points mean that the estimates of the 
costs and beneﬁts of (in)action may vary substantially across climate scenarios with 
the assumptions on agents’ utility function, future productivity growth rate, and 
intertemporal discount rate (Stern, 2008, Pyndick, 2013).
 ? Endogeneity and circularity of climate risk. The likelihood of achieving the global cli-
mate targets depends on the orderly introduction of climate policies, and their antic-
ipation by ﬁnancial actors in their investment decisions. However, climate policies’ 
uncertainty aﬀects investors’ expectations on the ﬁnancial risk deriving from the 
very same policies, and thus their investment decision. In turn, the lack of climate 
aligned investments makes it impossible to achieve the climate policy targets. This 
generates the possibility of multiple equilibria, a situation where a  rational agent 
cannot identify a preferred investment strategy (Battiston and Monasterolo, 2018).
47 https://www.bis.org/review/r180419b.htm
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4.2. THE CLIMAFIN CLIMATE FINANCIAL RISK PRICING MODEL
4.2.1. Climate policy scenarios
We consider the climate policy scenarios developed by the International Scientiﬁc Com-
munity and reviewed by the IPCC. In particular, we select all the climate policy scenarios 
aligned to the 2°C target made available from the LIMITS project, which includes six 
IAMs. We use the LIMITS project database (Kriegler et al., 2013) to compute the trajec-
tories of the shocks in the market shares for several variables, including the output of 
all the economic activities in primary and secondary energy (e.g. primary energy from 
fossil fuels, electricity produced by solar panels, etc.) conditioned to climate policies’ 
introduction (i.e. a carbon tax). The two emissions concentration targets chosen under 
milder and tighter climate policy scenarios (i.e. 500 parts per million (ppm) and 450 ppm) 
refer to the stabilization concentration of CO2 at the end of century consistently with 
the 2°C aligned scenarios, and are associated to two diﬀerent policy implementation 
scenarios, i.e. the
Reference Policy (RefPol) and the Strong Policy (StrPol) (IPCC, 2014). RefPol assumes 
a weak near-term target by 2020 with fragmented countries’ action, while StrPol assumes 
a stringent near-term target by 2020 with fragmented countries’ action, to achieve emis-
sions reduction by 2050. The 500 and 450 ppm scenarios are associated to a probabil-
ity of exceeding the 2°C target by 35-59% and 20-41% respectively (Menishausen et al., 
2009). Thus, the choice of speciﬁc emissions concentration targets could be considered 
as a proxy for the stringency of the global emission cap imposed by potential climate 
treaty. A change in climate policy (i.e. in the value of the carbon tax every 5 years’ time 
step) implies a change in the sectors’ macroeconomic trajectory, and thus a change in the 
market share of primary and secondary energy sources based on their energy technology 
(fossil/renewable).
4.2.2. Climate policy shocks
In the context of climate transition risks, climate policy shocks are deﬁned as the transi-
tion from a business as usual scenario of no climate policy, to a policy scenario charac-
terised by the introduction of a climate policy (e.g. a carbon tax, or a Green Supporting 
Factor). Climate policy shocks arise from a disorderly transition, i.e. when the introduc-
tion of climate-aligned policies is carried out at a  schedule that is not predictable by 
investors. These, in turn, cannot fully anticipate (and price) it in their portfolios’ risk man-
agement strategies (Battiston et al., 2017; NGSF, 2019). In the current scenario where 
governments have not coordinated yet to introduce stable climate policies, we might 
end up in a disorderly transition scenario (Battiston, 2019). The transition entails a jump 
from one equilibrium state of the economy (e.g. the current state) to another equilibrium 
state where the composition of the economy and the weight of the economic activities 
(carbon-intensive, low-carbon) could consistently change.
In a disorderly transition, assets price adjustments would directly or indirectly negatively 
impact the value of fossil fuels and related assets. The lack of investors’ anticipation of 
the climate policy shock could have relevant and long-lasting consequences for the ﬁ-
nancial conditions of a private investor and of a sovereign, and eventually it would aﬀect 
the achievement of the 2°C aligned climate mitigation scenarios. As several recent policy 
events show (e.g. the US withdrawal from Paris Agreement, the outcome of 2018 Italian 
elections), the assessment of the future policy shock could be incorrect even on average 
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across market participants, and yet can have severe long-term eﬀects on the ﬁnancial 
conditions of a country (Battiston, 2019).
4.2.3. Investors’ information set
Here we present the information set that a rational risk averse investor should use to 
assess ﬁnancial risk under climate transition scenarios. We consider a risk averse investor 
that aims to assess the exposure of her portfolio to forward-looking climate transition 
risk. This information set can accommodate the presence of incomplete information and 
deep uncertainty (Keynes, 1973; Knight, 1921; Greenwald and Stiglitz, 1986). The informa-
tion set covers a time-horizons that is relevant both for investment strategies and for the 
low-carbon transition from 2020 to 2050, and is composed of:
 ? Climate policy scenarios corresponding to Greenhouse Gases (GHG) emission 
reduction target across regions (B = Business-as-Usual), provided e.g. by the IPCC 
reports;
 ? The future economic trajectories for carbon-intensive and low-carbon activities, 
provided by climate economic models (e.g. IAMs);
 ? A set of forward-looking Climate Policy Shock Scenarios intended as a disorderly 
transition from B (Business as Usual) to P (a given climate policy scenario);
 ? A set of Climate Policy Shocks on the economic output of low-carbon/carbon-in-
tensive activities, on their Gross Value Added (GVA) and on their contribution to 
the ﬁscal revenues of the sovereign. The policy shocks are conditioned to transition 
scenarios and, to a speciﬁc climate economic model.
4.2.4. Investors’ risk management strategy
The investor’s risk management strategy is based on the minimization of the worst-case 
losses of the portfolio under diﬀerent forward-looking climate transition scenarios. The 
deﬁnition of the risk management strategy accounts for (i) the investor’s speciﬁc risk 
aversion levels, (ii) the counterparty risk adjusted for climate policy shock scenarios (e.g. 
Probability of Default (PD)), (iii) metrics relevant for ﬁnancial regulation (e.g. risk mea-
sures such as the Climate Spread and VaR). The Climate VaR Management Strategy can 
be written as:
ClimVaRStr = min
Portfolio
{max
Shock
?????????????????????????????????????
In this context, future asset prices are subject to shocks that depend on the issuer’s 
future economic performance, the risk premia demanded by the market, as well as the 
implementation of the climate policy and the outcome of the energy transition of indi-
vidual ﬁrms and countries. The investor considers diﬀerent feasible climate policy sce-
narios (but has no information on the probability associated) for which she can calculate 
the impacts (negative or positive) on the market share of carbon-intensive or low-carbon 
economic activities and ﬁrms. The investor is subject to incomplete information on her 
(and competitors’) exposure to risk stemming from a disordered transition from a climate 
policy scenario to another one, uncertainty on the outcome of the ﬁrms and country’s 
energy transition, and no information on the probability distribution. Thus, her risk man-
agement strategy is to consider a  set of feasible climate transition scenarios that her 
portfolio should withstand, and then compute the VaR conditional to those scenarios.
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4.2.5. Composition of the economy
We consider n countries j whose economy is composed of m economic sectors S. Eco-
nomic activities included in S are based on a reﬁned classiﬁcation of the Climate Policy 
Relevant Sectors (CPRS Rev 2), which identify the main sectors that are relevant for cli-
mate transition risk (fossil-fuel, electricity (from fossil or renewable sources), energy-in-
tensive, transportation (low/high-carbon), buildings), and were originally introduced in 
Battiston et al. (2017). As a diﬀerence from the NACE classiﬁcation of economic sectors, 
CPRS Rev 2 capture the energy and electricity technology embedded in the econom-
ic activity (e.g. utility|electricity|wind, solar, gas). Firms that compose economic sectors 
S are considered as a portfolio of cash-ﬂows. The classiﬁcation of countries and regions 
aﬀected by the climate shock is based on the LIMITS aggregation48, see Kriegler et al. 
(2013).
4.2.6. Impact of climate policy shock on economic activities’ GVA and proﬁtability
We consider the contribution of issuer j to the sector S GVA and ﬁscal assets and how 
this can be aﬀected by changes in its economic performance, either negatively or pos-
itively. We then relate the performance of the economic activity to the change in its 
market share as a result of a climate transition scenario.
In a disorderly transition, a climate policy shock aﬀects the performance of issuers in 
sectors S via a change in economic activities’ market share, cash ﬂows and proﬁtability, 
eventually aﬀecting the GVA of the sector. The climate policy shock is calculated at the 
sector, country and regional level. The country’s GVA composition is available at NACE 
2-digit level from oﬃcial statistics (e.g. from Eurostat). Negative shocks result from the 
policy impact on the GVA of sectors based on carbon-intensive (i.e. fossil fuels) tech-
nologies, while positive shocks result from the impact on the GVA of sectors based on 
low-carbon (i.e. renewable energy) technologies.
We assume that a percentage shock on output to a percentage shock on GVA, ????? ?,for 
each sector j,so that:
Where ??????? ?(P) is the shock on the GVA of sector S of the sovereign issuer j; ??????? ?(B) 
is the share of GVA of sector S. We then deﬁne the net ﬁscal assets related to sector S, 
Aj(S),as the diﬀerence between accrued ﬁscal revenues from sector S and public invest-
ments and subsidies granted by j  to the same sector. The impact of the market share 
shock (resulting from the policy shock P) on net ﬁscal assets of sector S is thus assumed 
to imply a change Aj(S, P, M) as follows:
Where 
?
? denotes the elasticity of sector S proﬁtability with respect to the market share. 
While the policy shock could aﬀect at the same time several sectors in the economy 
of the issuer j, here we consider the total net eﬀect on the issuer’s net ﬁscal assets as 
follows:
48 See the LIMITS database documentation for more details https://tntcat.iiasa.ac.at/LIMITSDB/ static/down-
load/LIMITS_overview_SOM_Study_Protocol_Final.pdf
????????? ?????????? ? ??????????????? ? ? ????
??????? ?????????? ?
?
?????? ? ?
????? ? ????????? ??????
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?????? ? ?
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?????
?? ?? ? ??? ?????? ?????
?????
?? ?
The elasticity coeﬃcient could be estimated empirically for the speciﬁc sectors of the 
sovereign issuers in the portfolio. However, in our application, the data to carry out this 
estimation was not available. Thus, for estimating the elasticity we consider a mild and 
adverse scenario with values equal to equal to 0.2 and 0.5, respectively (see also Battis-
ton and Monasterolo, 2019). This allows us to provide an estimation of the magnitude of 
the shocks due to a given climate policy scenarios P, where the shock is transmitted to 
the value of the sovereign bond via the change in sectors’ market share, GDP and ﬁscal 
assets.
4.2.7. Model for sovereign bonds’ valuation
We consider a risky (defaultable) bond of a sovereign entity j, issued at t0 with maturity 
T. The value of the sovereign bond at time T, with R being the Recovery Rate of the bond 
(i.e. the percentage of notional recovered upon default), and LGD Loss-Given-Default 
(i.e. the percentage loss) can be written as:
The unitary price Pj(t) of the sovereign bond at time t<T and t>t0 follows the usual deﬁni-
tion of discounted expected value at the maturity,
where rf is the risk-free rate and the expectation is taken under the risk neutral measure. 
Moreover, the cumulative probability of default Q, is related to the annual probability 
of default as follows: Q = 1 – (1 – q)(T – t).The formula can be used to determine from the 
market price the value of the annual default probability q, called “q implied”, for a given 
risk free rate and LGD. In the case of a multi-coupon bond, the formula gets more compli-
cated since one has to sum over the expected value of the coupons but the logic remains 
the same. For each coupon k, the coupon amount is assumed to be paid only if j does 
not default before. The determination of the q implied requires then to solve numerically 
a polynomial equation.
4.2.8. Sovereign default conditions
Following a stream of literature (Gray et al., 2007), we model the payoﬀ of the default-
able sovereign bond as dependent on the ability of the sovereign to repay the debt out 
of its ﬁscal revenues accrued until the maturity. Diﬀerently from Gray et al. (2007), we 
do not consider whether debt is issued in local or foreign currency, nor the exchange 
rate risk.
We can deﬁne the sovereign’s net ﬁscal assets at the present time of the valuation and at 
the maturity respectively as Aj(t) and Aj(T),and the liabilities at the maturity as Lj(T).Thus, 
the sovereign default conditions read as:
????? = ??? ? ?? ?????????????????????????????????????????? ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ??????
?
?? ? ????????? ? ???? ???????]= ??? ?????? ? ???? ?? ? ???????
?
?????= ????? (1+?????)<?????? 
?
??????= ??????- ????? = ? ????????
?????
???? , with ????? = ????? - ????? 
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We add a climate policy shock ?? on j’s net ﬁscal assets (as a “jump” up or down), assum-
ing that the idiosyncratic shock ?? and policy shock ?? are independent. The new sover-
eign default condition reads as:
?????= ????? (1+????? ? ?????)<?????? ? ????? < ?????  
= ??????????? – 1 - ????? ?? 
where ????? is the default threshold under scenario P, ????? is the climate policy shock 
from B to P (can be positive or negative) that shifts the idiosyncratic shock ??, with ?????>1, 
possibly correlated across j.
4.2.9. Sovereign default probability
We can deﬁne the Probability of Default (PD) qj(P) of issuer j under Climate Policy Sce-
nario P as:
where ???????? is the probability distribution of idiosyncratic shock ??, ????? is the lower 
bound of distribution support.
In principle, frequent small productivity shocks across time and ﬁrms occur in a similar 
way, with or without the climate policy shock. We introduce now a proposition of the 
PD adjustment ?? conditioned to the climate policy shock, which shifts the probability 
distribution of the small productivity shocks and thus the default probability of issuer j:
Thus, assuming that the climate policy shock on ﬁscal asset is proportional to shock 
on GVA of low-carbon and carbon-intensive sectors i.e. ?? = ????????? (P), with elasticity 
the adjustment ???????, the default probability of sovereign j under Climate Policy Shock 
Scenario:
 ? Increases with GVA shock magnitude |???????(P)|  if ???????(P)<0?, and decreases vice ver-
sa;
Is proportional to the GVA shocks on the CPRS (in the limit of small Climate Policy 
Shocks).
?
????? = ? (?? < ?????) = ? ????????????????????  
?
??????= ??????- ????? = ? ????????
?????
???? , with ????? = ????? - ????? 
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5. EMPIRICAL RESULTS
Overall, we consider the combination of two market conditions scenarios with climate 
policy scenarios described in Section 4. The market condition scenarios are reﬂected in 
the diﬀerent values of loss-given-default LGD and elasticity.In the mild scenario, LGD = 
0.2 and = 0.2. In the adverse scenario, LGD = 0.4 and = 0.5.
For each scenario combination and IAM, we compute the shock on the value of each 
bond in the holdings’ dataset. The description of the scenarios considered in this exercise 
are provided in the Appendix. We then compute the resulting aggregate shocks on the 
value of the portfolio of each European insurance company (“solo”). We deﬁne as port-
folio impact of the climate policy shock the ratio of the value of the portfolio after the 
shock over the initial value before the shock. In a series of boxplots, we study the distri-
bution of the values of the portfolio impact of climate policy shocks under varying levels 
of aggregation. The diﬀerence between the median impact and 100% is considered as 
the median shock on the portfolio values.
Notice that three dimensions drive the magnitude of portfolio impact. First, for each sov-
ereign bond negative shocks (e.g. on primary energy fossil sector) can be possibly com-
pensated by positive shocks (e.g. on secondary energy electricity based on renewable 
sources). Second, in a portfolio of sovereign bonds issued by several countries, negative 
aggregate shocks from a less climate-aligned sovereign can be possibly compensated by 
positive shocks from another more climate-aligned sovereign (see also Appendix Table 
A1.3). Third, in some of the ﬁgures the results from several models or several scenari-
os are pooled together in one distribution. These three dimensions concur to limit the 
magnitude of the median value of the portfolio impact in the following charts. Further, 
recall that in this application of the CLIMAFIN framework, we do not consider the mac-
ro-economic reverberations of a shock on a given sector. Therefore, the results are to be 
considered as conservative.   
Chart A1.1-2 show the box plots of the portfolio impact distribution across insurance 
holders and IAMs, for selected climate policy scenarios. Chart A1.1 and A1.2 refer, respec-
tively, to the mild and adverse scenario on market conditions. In the mild scenario, the 
ﬁrst quartile of the distribution varies between 99.6% and 99.8%. In the adverse scenar-
io, the same quantity varies between 98.2% and 99.4%. The median shock in the adverse 
scenario is about 3 times larger than in the mild scenario.
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Figure A1.1: Distribution of impact on sovereign hold-
ings of European insurers across climate policy shock 
scenarios, under the mild scenario on market condi-
tions.
Figure A1.2: Distribution of impact on sovereign 
holdings of European insurers across climate policy 
shock scenarios, under the adverse scenario on market 
conditions.
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Note: Y-axis corresponds to the percentage of the original value of government portfolios (e.g. 100% expresses 0% impact, 97% corresponds to drop of 3%). The 
description of scenarios is provided in Appendix.
Chart A1.3-4 show the box plots of the portfolio impact distribution across holders, estimat-
ed by the model MESSAGE (Krey et al. 2016; Fricko et al. 2017), for selected climate policy 
scenarios. Chart A1.3 and A1.4 refer, respectively, to the mild and adverse scenario on market 
conditions. In the mild scenario, the ﬁrst quartile of the distribution varies between 99.3% 
and 99.8%. In the adverse scenario, the same quantity varies between 97.4% and 99.0%. 
The median shock in the adverse scenario is again about three times larger than in the mild 
scenario.
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Figure A1.3: Distribution of impact on sovereign 
holdings of European insurers estimated by the model 
MESSAGE across climate policy shock scenarios, under 
the mild scenario on market conditions.
Figure A1.4: Distribution of impact on sovereign 
holdings of European insurers estimated by the model 
MESSAGE across climate policy shock scenarios, under 
the adverse scenario on market conditions.
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Note: Y-axis corresponds to the percentage of the original value of government portfolios (e.g. 100% expresses 0% impact, 97% corresponds to drop of 3%). The descrip-
tion of scenarios is provided in Appendix.
Chart A1.5-6 shows the box plots of the portfolio impact distribution across holders, 
conditioned to the country of the insurance holder, for a given selected climate policy 
scenario, and estimated across all the models in the LIMITS database (Kriegler et al. 2013). 
Chart A1.5 refers to the climate policy scenario RefPol500 and the mild market condition 
scenario. Chart A1.6 refers to the climate policy scenario StrPol450 and the adverse mar-
ket condition scenario. In the mild scenario, the ﬁrst quartile of the distribution varies 
between 99.3% and 100.0%. In the adverse scenario, theﬁrst quartile varies between 
96.2% and 99.5%. The median shock in the adverse scenario is about 5 times larger than 
in the mild scenario. Note that we have excluded countries for which the number of ob-
servations did not allow to draw the box plot (i.e. Romania in A1.5, Romania and Iceland 
in A1.6).
Figure A1.5: Distribution of impact on sovereign holdings of European insurers conditioned to the country of the 
holder, across climate policy shock scenarios and under the mild scenario on market conditions.
99.0%
99.5%
100.0%
100.5%
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Source: EIOPA and own calculations
Note: Y-axis corresponds to the percentage of the original value of government portfolios (e.g. 100% expresses 0% impact, 97% corresponds to drop of 3%). The descrip-
tion of the scenarios is provided in Appendix.
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Figure A1.6: Distribution of impact on sovereign holdings of European insurers conditioned to the country of the 
holder, across climate policy shock scenarios and under the adverse scenario on market conditions.
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Source: EIOPA and own calculations
Note: Y-axis corresponds to the percentage of the original value of government portfolios (e.g. 100% expresses 0% impact, 97% corresponds to drop of 3%). The descrip-
tion of the scenarios is provided in Appendix.
The results of this analysis should be considered as conservative for the following rea-
sons. First, since global GHG emissions are still increasing (WMO 2019) and countries 
are not aligning their policies to their climate pledges, stricter climate policies might be 
introduced. Second, the IAMs’ policy scenarios that we considered were deﬁned before 
the Paris Agreement. Thus, tighter policy scenarios are likely to be needed to achieve the 
2°C target. Further, it must be noticed that the energy technology shocks (both on fossil 
and renewable energy sources) vary considerably across the IAMs used, for the same 
regions and countries considered. Finally, we should consider investors’ sentiments, i.e. 
the expectations about changes in (even few decimal points) in GVA and GDP growth 
could impact sovereign bonds’ yields.
6.  CONCLUSION
In this analysis, we have developed the ﬁrst climate transition risk assessment of the sov-
ereign bonds’ portfolios of solo insurance companies in Europe under deep uncertainty. 
This is the result of the ﬁrst collaboration between, climate economics modellers, climate 
ﬁnancial risk scholars and researchers from a public authority with a mandate to contrib-
ute to ﬁnancial stability. We opted for the CLIMAFIN framework by Battiston et al. (2019) 
because it is the ﬁrst and transparent approach that combines 1) forward-looking climate 
transition risk shocks obtained from climate economic models that are the reference for 
scientiﬁc community and the IPCC (in this context, the LIMITS IAMs) with; 2) climate 
ﬁnancial risk metrics and methods that are now a reference in both the academic and 
practitioners’ community (Battiston et al., 2017). In particular, the CLIMAFIN approach 
allows to embed forward-looking climate transition risk scenarios (i.e. a disorderly intro-
duction of climate policies that cannot be fully anticipated and priced in by insurers) in 
the valuation of counterparty risk, in the probability of default of individual sovereign 
bonds and largest losses on investors’ portfolios (Battiston et al., 2019).
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In this application, we have considered a  simple ﬁnancial pricing model for zero and 
multi-coupon sovereign bonds adjusted for climate policy shock scenarios. This allows 
to compute an adjusted value of bonds’ portfolios in order to assess how future climate 
transition risk could aﬀect the probability of default of individual sovereign bonds, the 
ﬁnancial solvability of the sovereign and the performance of European insurers who are 
exposed to those bonds. The analysis uses the solo data of insurers from 31 countries in 
EU/EEA that reported Solvency II data at the end of 2018, including all insurers’ invest-
ments into sovereign bonds, complemented by information on the characteristics of the 
bonds available from the CSDB.
Our results show that the potential impact of a disorderly low carbon transition on in-
surers portfolios of sovereign bonds is moderate in terms of its magnitude. However, it 
is non-negligible in several feasible scenarios. Overall, it emerges that the climate policy 
transition path chosen, and the role of fossil fuels and renewable energy technologies in 
the sovereign’s GVA and ﬁscal revenues, can considerably aﬀect the ﬁscal and ﬁnancial 
risk position of a country, via the change in the probability of default (PD) and in the val-
ue of the sovereign bonds and the Climate Spread. In general, countries that have already 
started to align their economy to the low-carbon transition (and thus where renewable 
energy technologies play a larger role on its GVA and ﬁscal revenues) face a decrease in 
the PD and in the Climate Spread, and thus better reﬁnancing conditions. In contrast, 
countries whose GVA is carbon intensive would face an increase in the PD and in the 
Climate Spread.
This, in turn, could have relevant implications for the ﬁnancial risk proﬁle of the insurers 
who own sovereign bonds of countries that are misaligned to the low-carbon transition 
and the climate targets. Thus, it would be in the interest of insurers’ supervisors to ex-
tend this climate ﬁnancial risk pricing exercise (ideally in a climate stress-test exercise, 
see e.g. Battiston et al., 2017) for ﬁnancial risk monitoring and assessment purposes.
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APPENDIX
CLIMATE POLICIES SCENARIOS LIMITS. 
In this exercise we consider the scenarios elaborated by the international scientiﬁc con-
sortium LIMITS. This is a database of economic trajectories that are consistent with 10 
climate transition scenarios. The main features of climate mitigation are the following:
 ? The level of ambition in emission reduction in the near-term (2020):
 ? reference policy ‘weak’ corresponds to unconditional Copenhagen Pledges; 
more ‘stringent’ based on conditional Copenhagen Pledges.
 ? The level of ambition in emission reduction in the long-term (2100):
 ? either no target or concentrations targets of 450 and 500 ppm CO2-eq, corre-
sponding to high chances of achieving 2°C
 ? The level of international cooperation until 2020 and 2030:
 ? no cooperation, fragmented action, coordinated action.
Table A1.2: LIMITS scenarios’ characteristics.
Scenario 
class
Scenario name Scenario 
type
Level of 
ambition 
(near term)
Level of 
ambition 
(long term)
Level of 
international 
cooperation
No policy Base Baseline None N/A None
Fragmented 
action
RefPol Reference Weak 2100 None
StrPol Reference Stringent 2100 None
Immediate 
action
450 Benchmark None N/A 450 ppm
500 Benchmark None N/A 500 ppm
Delayed 
Policy
RefPol-450 Climate 
Policy
Weak 2020 450 ppm
Delayed 
Policy
StrPol-450 Climate 
Policy
Stringent 2020 500 ppm
Delayed 
Policy
RefPol-500 Climate 
Policy
Weak 2020 500 ppm
Delayed 
Policy
StrPol-500 Climate 
Policy
Stringent 2020 500 ppm
Delayed 
Action
RefPol2030-500 Climate 
Policy
Weak 2030 501 ppm
Source: Table based on: E. Kriegler, M. Tavoni, T. Aboumahboub, G. Luderer, K. Calvin, G. De Maere, V. Krey, K. Riahi, H. 
Rosler, M. Schaeﬀer, D. van Vuuren (2013): Climate Change Economics 4(4), doi: 10.1142/S2010007813400083.
We consider the trajectories computed under 6 Integrated Assessment Models (AIM-En-
duse, GCAM, IMAGE, MESSAGE, REMIND, and WITCH). More information is available 
at: https://tntcat.iiasa.ac.at/LIMITSDB/dsd?Action=htmlpage&page=about#tutorial
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CLIMATE POLICIES SCENARIO LIMITS REDPOL-450 MILD 
COMPUTED WITH THE IAM MESSAGE
The following table provides simple average of results of shock for the scenario LIMITS 
RedPol-450 mild computed with the IAM MESSAGE aggregated by bond issuers and 
their residual maturities. The sovereigns that were not suﬃciently represented across dif-
ferent residual maturities were excluded from the table. As sovereign bonds that are held 
by insurers in their investment portfolios could have diﬀerent parameters, the obtained 
results were smoothed out using estimated linear trends. In this way the results could 
be generated even for residual maturities that were not available in our data sample. The 
following table could be used as an illustrative example how to integrate forward-look-
ing climate transition in a bottom up insurance stress test. The climate shocks could be 
then combined with other shocks, e.g. market shocks prescribed in the given stress test 
scenario.
Table A1.3: Average impact of scenario LIMITS RedPol-450 mild computed by IAM 
MESSAGE for diﬀerent sovereigns and residual maturities 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 15 20
Austria -0.31% -0.33% -0.35% -0.37% -0.38% -0.40% -0.42% -0.44% -0.46% -0.48% -0.57% -0.66%
Belgium -0.24% -0.27% -0.29% -0.31% -0.34% -0.36% -0.38% -0.41% -0.43% -0.45% -0.57% -0.68%
Denmark -0.07% -0.10% -0.13% -0.16% -0.19% -0.22% -0.25% -0.29% -0.32% -0.35% -0.50% -0.65%
Finland -0.07% -0.11% -0.15% -0.19% -0.23% -0.27% -0.31% -0.35% -0.39% -0.42% -0.62% -0.82%
France -0.32% -0.34% -0.37% -0.39% -0.42% -0.45% -0.47% -0.50% -0.52% -0.55% -0.67% -0.80%
Germany -0.12% -0.19% -0.25% -0.31% -0.38% -0.44% -0.50% -0.56% -0.63% -0.69% -1.00% -1.32%
Greece -0.26% -0.27% -0.27% -0.28% -0.28% -0.29% -0.30% -0.30% -0.31% -0.31% -0.34% -0.37%
lceland 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
lreland -0.01% -0.07% -0.13% -0.18% -0.24% -0.30% -0.36% -0.42% -0.48% -0.54% -0.83% -1.12%
ltaly -0.22% -0.2.3% -0.25% -0.26% -0.27% -0.29% -0.30% -0.31% -0.33% -0.34% -0.40% -0.47%
Luxembourg -0.02% -0.04% -0.07% -0.09% -0.12% -0.14% -0.16% -0.19% -0.21% -0.24% -0.36% -0.48%
Netherlands -0.10% -0.20% -0.30% -0.40% -0.50% -0.60% -0.70% -0.80% -0.90% -1.00% -1.49% -1.99%
Norway -0.01% -0.01% -0.02% -0.02% -0.02% -0.03% -0.03% -0.04% -0.04% -0.04% -0.06% -0.08%
Poland -0.74% -0.73% -0.72% -0.71% -0.70% -0.69% -0.68% -0.67% -0.66% -0.65% -0.60% -0.54%
Spain -0.18% -0.21% -0.25% -0.28% -0.32% -0.35% -0.39% -0.42% -0.46% -0.49% -0.67% -0.84%
Sweden -0.02% -0.02% -0.02% -0.01% -0.01% -0.01% -0.01% 0.00% 0.00% -0.01% 0.00% 0.01%
United Kingdom -0.33% -0.28% -0.23% -0.18% -0.12% -0.40% -0.44% -0.47% -0.50% -0.53% -0.69% -0.85%
Switzerland -0.24% -0.28% -0.31% -0.34% -0.37% -0.07% -0.02% 0.00% 0.00% 0.14% 0.40% 0.66%
United States -0.13% -0.13% -0.14% -0.14% -0.15% -0.16% -0.16% -0.17% -0.18% -0.18% -0.22% -0.25%
Source: EIOPA and own calculations
Note: The columns represent residual maturities. The obtained results were smoothed out cross residual maturities using 
estimated linear trends.
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